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FACT SHEET #71: SHORTCHANGING THE UNPAID 
ACADEMIC INTERN 
Patricia L. Reid∗ 
Abstract 
On the eve of the Fair Labor Standards Act’s seventy-fifth 
anniversary, unpaid academic internships threaten to outpace 
government regulation and undermine opportunities for gainful 
employment. Although coveted by students eager to fill a line on their 
résumé, unpaid academic internships are a subspecies of unpaid 
internships that might soon face extinction. While the advent of unpaid 
internship litigation decreases the likelihood that employers will plead 
ignorance of the law when they defend against disgruntled unpaid 
interns, recent litigation does little to clear up a half-century of 
contradictory case law. The only certainty that surrounds the legal status 
of unpaid academic internships is that Fact Sheet #71, the current 
regulatory mechanism, shortchanges the unpaid academic intern. Fact 
Sheet #71’s six-prong test neither affords meaningful protection nor 
fosters beneficial learning opportunities. 
Congress must exchange Fact Sheet #71’s old currency for a new 
currency, a currency that invests in America’s future and fosters 
meaningful internship opportunities for students. The key to effective 
regulation is distinguishing between educationally beneficial and 
educationally deficient unpaid internships. This distinction will 
simultaneously safeguard students from unfair employment 
relationships and allow students to prosper in educationally beneficial 
opportunities. To successfully revise the current regulations, Congress 
must first understand why the six-prong test fails to promote uniform 
interpretation and application. Second, Congress must delegate its 
regulatory power to the Department of Education, the most qualified 
agency to measure the educational value of unpaid academic 
internships. And third, Congress must codify a new test, one that  
provides a predictable legal framework on which students and 
employers can rely. Only then, when Congress exchanges its old 
regulations for new, will Congress stop shortchanging students and 
invest in their future. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In an era in which over one-third of college students complete an 
internship before graduation,1 internships are “key in today’s 
economy”2 and “the gateway into the white-collar work force.”3 Career 
experts proclaim that “the academic experience alone is just not 
                                                                                                                     
 1. Menachem Wecker, 10 National Universities That Produce the Most Interns, US 
NEWS & WORLD REP. (Nov. 20, 2012), http://www.usnews.com/education/best-colleges/the-short-
list-college/articles/2012/11/20/10-national-universities-that-produce-the-most-interns (noting that, 
among ranked colleges that report internship data, 36.9% of students had an internship). Some 
colleges’ internship participation rates are much higher. For example, eighty-six percent of 
Clarkson University graduates interned, a statistic that earned the school the right to claim that it 
had “the largest percentage of interns among the class of 2011.” Id.  
 2. Beth Braccio Hering, Why Are Internships So Important?, MSN CAREERS (Mar. 1, 
2010, 12:36 PM), http://msn.careerbuilder.com/Article/MSN-2202-College-Internships-First-
Jobs-Why-Are-Internships-So-Important (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 3. Steven Greenhouse, The Unpaid Intern, Legal or Not, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/03/business/03intern.html (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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enough.”4 These experts urge students to “get as many internships as 
[they] possibly can” because “[g]etting a degree doesn’t mean [they 
will] get a job.”5 Companies like Dream Careers, Inc. (f/k/a University 
of Dreams) detect this mounting pressure and convince ambitious 
students and gullible parents to pay as much as $10,000 for an unpaid 
“guaranteed internship placement” with a desirable name like 
DreamWorks, Dolce & Gabana, or Merrill Lynch.6 Whether bought or 
earned, unpaid internships are everywhere,7 even in the White House.8 
Of the 1.5 million internships in the United States, nearly half are 
unpaid.9 What about internships is so desirable that around 750,000 
people work for free each year?10 Perhaps the opportunity to acquire a 
new profession’s skills entices students.11 Maybe they seek “real life 
                                                                                                                     
 4. Kate Merrill, Employers Taking Advantage of Unpaid Interns, CBS BOS. (June 28, 
2012, 11:59 PM), http://boston.cbslocal.com/2012/06/28/survey-questions-benefits-of-unpaid-
internships (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 5. Alan Farnham, Job Prospects for New Grads Best Since Recession, ABC NEWS (May 
15, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/jobs-outlook-college-graduates/story?id=16345862 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 6. See generally DREAM CAREERS, http://www.summerinternships.com (last visited June 
17, 2014). For a list of prospective employers, see Employer List, DREAM CAREERS, 
http://www.summerinternships.com/employerList (last visited June 17, 2014). Regarding Dream 
Careers’ tuition, see Kristen Sze, Students Pay Big Bucks for Internships, ABC 7 NEWS (Feb. 6, 
2009), http://abclocal.go.com/kgo/story?section=news/education&id=6644672 (“[F]ees range 
from $5,000 to $10,000 . . . .”). 
 7. While still a staple of industries such as film and journalism, unpaid internships 
now permeate nearly every field, including fashion, publishing, marketing, public relations, 
art, law, and medicine. Tracie Powell, How to Tell When Unpaid Internships Are Opportunities, 
When They’re Abuse, POYNTER (May 10, 2012, 10:51 AM), http://www.poynter.org/how-tos/career-
development/173377/how-to-tell-when-unpaid-internships-are-opportunities-when-theyre-an-abuse 
(last updated May 10, 2012, 2:58 PM). 
 8. Internship Timeline and FAQs, WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/about/
internships/FAQs (last visited June 17, 2014). In early 2010, the Committee on Oversight and 
Government Reform investigated the White House’s unpaid internship program. Letter from 
Darrell Issa, Ranking Member, Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, to Barack Obama, 
President, U.S. (Apr. 12, 2010), available at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/ 
IssaLettertoPOTUS-Interns.pdf. Despite groups’ attempts to affect change, the White House 
internships remain unpaid due to an exception to minimum wage laws for unpaid internships 
with government agencies. Julia Fisher, Revealed: The Insiders Whose Kids Got White House 
Internships, NEW REPUBLIC (Sept. 24, 2013), http://www.newrepublic.com/node/114844. 
 9. Paul Davidson, Fewer Unpaid Internships to Be Offered, USA TODAY (Mar. 7, 2012, 
7:59 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/workplace/story/2012-03-07/summer-intern 
ships-paid-unpaid/53404886/1. There are no official records of the total number of unpaid 
internships. See Natalie Bacon, Note, Unpaid Internships: The History, Policy, and Future 
Implications of “Fact Sheet #71,” 6 OHIO ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 67, 69 (2011). 
 10. Davidson, supra note 9. 
 11. KATHRYN ANNE EDWARDS & ALEXANDER HERTEL-FERNANDEZ, DĒMOS, PAVING THE 
WAY THROUGH PAID INTERNSHIPS: A PROPOSAL TO EXPAND EDUCATIONAL AND ECONOMIC 
OPPORTUNITIES FOR LOW-INCOME COLLEGE STUDENTS 3 (2010), available at 
http://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/PavingWay_PaidInternships_Demos.pdf. 
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experience” outside the classroom.12 Or maybe students view 
internships as a foot in the door to future employment.13 Either way, the 
fact that 84% of college students plan to intern before they graduate14 
illustrates the mass appeal of internships. 
While many commentators praise the unpaid academic internship 
system, others find fault with its very core. Some, for example, 
condemn the system for its indirect exclusion of students of modest 
means15 and its disproportionate exclusion of minorities.16 Others 
lament the loss of tax revenues that support Social Security, 
unemployment, and workers’ compensation premiums.17 Critics blame 
wage depression on an oversupply of free interns.18 They often blame 
universities and colleges for “farm[ing] out” free labor in exchange for 
easy tuition dollars.19 But what most alarms critics is the tendency of 
unpaid internships to depress interns’ expectations and to create 
overidentification with employers.20 Scholars therefore worry that 
unpaid internships ultimately damage the career prospects of young 
interns.21 
                                                                                                                     
 12. Why You Need an Internship, HISP. SCHOLARSHIP FUND (internal quotation marks 
omitted), http://web.archive.org/web/20101215065716/http://hsf.net/cCenter-inner.aspx?id= 
2564 (archived copy) (last visited June 17, 2014). 
 13. EDWARDS & HERTEL-FERNANDEZ, supra note 11, at 3. 
 14. Anya Kamenetz, Take This Internship and Shove It, N.Y. TIMES (May 30, 2006), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/30/opinion/30kamenetz.html. 
 15. EDWARDS & HERTEL-FERNANDEZ, supra note 11, at 3. In a recent exposé, the White 
House’s internship program was yet again under fire, this time for its focus on the privileged 
and for its failure to “represent a cross section of the nation.” Fisher, supra note 8; see also 
Ginia Bellafante, Seeking Chic, Brilliant Intern to Thread Needles (No Pay), N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 
15, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/16/nyregion/seeking-chic-edgy-brilliant-intern-to-
thread-needles-free.html (noting that unpaid internships “deprive[] an entire class of people 
from whole categories of entry-level work”). 
 16. Ross Eisenbrey, Unpaid Internships Hurt Mobility, ECON. POL’Y INST. BLOG (Jan. 5, 
2012, 3:42 PM), http://www.epi.org/blog/unpaid-internships-economic-mobility. 
 17. Ross Eisenbrey, Unpaid Internships: A Scourge on the Labor Market, ECON. POL’Y 
INST. BLOG (Feb. 7, 2012, 2:54 PM), http://www.epi.org/blog/unpaid-internships-scourge-labor-
market. 
 18. See Kamenetz, supra note 14. 
 19. Eisenbrey, supra note 17; Lydia Emmanouilidou, Internship Courses Raise 
Controversy, JUSTICE (Jan. 28, 2014), http://www.thejustice.org/news/internship-courses-raise-
controversy-1.3133566#.UuhE12Qo4y4 (last updated Jan. 28, 2014). Colleges and universities 
exploit unpaid interns in other manners, too. Some, for example, fill paid positions on their 
campuses with unpaid interns. In particular, undergraduate athletic and business departments are 
the subject of recent criticism and lawsuits. Casey McDermott, You Know Who Else Uses Unpaid 
Interns? Colleges and Universities, PAC. STANDARD (Dec. 30, 2013, 2:00 PM), http://www.psmag. 
com/navigation/business-economics/know-else-uses-unpaid-interns-colleges-universities-72118.  
 20. Kamenetz, supra note 14. 
 21. In 2013, a National Association of Colleges and Employers survey found that students 
who accept unpaid internships are at a later disadvantage when they negotiate for their first 
salary. The study found that students who work as unpaid interns make on average over $16,000 
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As the number of internships rises, 22 the unemployment rate among 
young workers sits at an unprecedented high.23 In 2010, for example, 
the total number of unemployed workers included a disproportionate 
percentage of young workers between the ages of sixteen and twenty-
four.24 Though this age group comprised only 13% of the labor force, 
they comprised 26% of the unemployed.25 Unemployment among 
young workers reached 19.6% in 2010—the highest unemployment 
level for the age group since 1947, when the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
first recorded unemployment rates.26 A period of unemployment early 
in life “can have lasting negative effects on future earnings, 
productivity, and employment opportunities.”27 Some commentators 
worry that, after the economy recovers, employers will permanently rely 
on unpaid interns to cut costs.28 Commentators worry that unpaid 
internships, like prolonged spells of unemployment, will damage the 
future job prospects of today’s young workers.29  
Similar risks caught Congress’s attention several decades ago when, 
in 1938, Congress tasked the Department of Labor (DOL) Wage and 
Hour Division (WHD) to ensure employer compliance with the Fair 
Labor Standards Act (FLSA)30 and to protect the interests of young 
                                                                                                                     
less in their first year than students who worked as paid interns. Students with previous unpaid 
internship experience make over $1,300 less than students with no prior internship experience. 
Class of 2013: Paid Interns Outpace Unpaid Peers in Job Offers, Salaries, NAT’L ASS’N CS. & 
EMPLOYERS (May 29, 2013), http://www.naceweb.org/s05292013/paid-unpaid-interns-job-
offer.aspx.  
 22. Bacon, supra note 9, at 69. 
 23. Alexander Eichler, Employment Rate for Young Adults Lowest in 60 Years, Study 
Says, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 9, 2012, 12:01 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/09/
employment-rate-young-adults_n_126424. 
 24. U.S. CONG. JOINT ECON. COMM., UNDERSTANDING THE ECONOMY: UNEMPLOYMENT 
AMONG YOUNG WORKERS 1 (2010), available at http://www.jec.senate.gov/public/
?a=Files.Serve&File_id=adaef80b-d1f3-479c-97e7-727f4c0d9ce6. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. E.g., Unpaid Internships: Not Just the Economy, SKILLEDUP, 
http://www.skilledup.com/unpaid-internships-not-just-the-economy (last visited June 17, 2014). 
Scholars who compare current unemployment rates with post-recession unemployment rates—
not all recorded rates—are less worried about the economy that young workers face. Farnham, 
supra note 5. Others are less worried because they believe that unpaid internships will never 
replace entry-level jobs because “[the] two roles aren’t cut from the same cloth,” “[t]he pay and 
benefits aren’t equal,” “[i]nterns have no legal protection,” and “[i]nternships don’t guarantee 
full-time employment.” Heather R. Huhman, 4 Reasons Internships Aren’t the New Entry-Level 
Jobs, PARADE (Jan. 28, 2014, 12:00 PM), http://parade.condenast.com/253997/heatherhuhman/4-
reasons-internships-arent-the-new-entry-level-jobs.  
 29. U.S. CONG. JOINT ECON. COMM., supra note 24, at 1. 
 30. See generally 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (1940). Congress enacted the Fair Labor 
Standards Act in 1938. The Act established a variety of standards for minimum wage, overtime 
pay, business recordkeeping, and youth employment. See id. The Act collides with unpaid 
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workers.31 After the U.S. Supreme Court decided the seminal unpaid-
worker case, Walling v. Portland Terminal, Co.,32 WHD developed the 
Court’s analysis into a six-prong test to accomplish these goals.33 From 
that point forward, WHD used the six-prong test to determine a 
worker’s entitlement to a minimum wage.34  
Subsequent courts continued to quarrel over the proper test to apply 
to unpaid worker lawsuits. As a result, the six-prong test’s interpretation 
and application in judicial settings was far from uniform. WHD’s 
memorialization of a simplified form of the six-prong test in Fact Sheet 
#71 did little to clarify the law, and now, after simmering for over sixty 
years, the courts’ disagreements form the basis of a wave of unpaid-
internship litigation.  
This wave of challenges to the legality of unpaid internships requires 
courts to reinterpret Portland Terminal, Fact Sheet #71, and other 
precedent. If courts unquestioningly accept Fact Sheet #71 and its six 
prongs, then their holdings could signal the “beginning of the end”35 for 
unpaid academic internships as employers cut internship programs in 
response to the increased legal risk.36  
Even though college graduates and middle-age workers now join the 
ranks of unpaid interns, this Note focuses only on unpaid academic 
internships. As such, it proposes a sustainable legal solution crafted 
specifically for students who seek academic credit as compensation for 
their work with private employers. Part I of this Note provides essential 
                                                                                                                     
internships because interns covered under the Act are entitled to a minimum wage, currently 
$7.25 per hour. Compliance Assistance – Wages and the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), U.S. 
DEP’T OF LABOR [hereinafter Compliance Assistance], http://www.dol.gov/whd/flsa/index.htm 
(last visited June 17, 2014). See infra Sections I.B–C for more discussion of the six factors 
WHD uses to determine whether the FLSA applies to an intern and thus entitles the intern to 
receive a minimum wage.  
 31. WHD created Fact Sheet #71 as a nonbinding source “for general information . . . not 
to be considered in the same light as official statements of position contained in regulations.” 
WAGE & HOUR DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FACT SHEET #71: INTERNSHIP PROGRAMS UNDER THE 
FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT (2010) [hereinafter FACT SHEET #71], 
http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs71.pdf. 
 32. 330 U.S. 148 (1947). Portland Terminal held that railroad company trainees were not 
employees, so the Fair Labor Standards Act did not prohibit the railroad company from training 
them without paying them the applicable minimum wage. Id. at 153. 
 33. See 1 LES A. SCHNEIDER & J. LARRY STINE, WAGE AND HOUR LAW § 3:13 & n.6 
(Westlaw updated Mar. 2014). 
 34. Id. § 3:13 (“Wage and Hour has taken the position that a person who meets all six of 
the following criteria is a trainee: . . . .”). 
 35. Josh Sanburn, The Beginning of the End of the Unpaid Internship, TIME (May 2, 
2012), http://moneyland.time.com/2012/05/02/the-beginning-of-the-end-of-the-unpaid-internship-as-
we-know-it. 
 36. Davidson, supra note 9; see Kit Johnson, The Wonderful World of Disney Visas, 63 
FLA. L. REV. 915, 943 (2011) (noting that the Walt Disney Company does not sponsor unpaid 
internships). 
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background to the unpaid internship debate. It begins with an analysis 
of the fundamental case that yielded the current employment status test, 
and then discusses the test’s economic context and subsequent 
application to unpaid internships. Part II details the state of today’s 
economy by tracking current unpaid internship litigation. It also 
explores three proposals to change current unpaid internship regulation 
by addressing the unique challenges today’s economy presents. 
Part III proposes a new form of unpaid academic internship 
regulation: a modified version of DOL’s six-prong test and Congress’s 
delegation of regulatory power over unpaid academic internships to the 
Department of Education (ED). This solution empowers the agency that 
is best equipped to evaluate the academic value of unpaid internships 
and to balance minimum wage concerns. Finally, this Note concludes 
with a discussion of how Congress’s delegation of regulatory power to 
ED will affect unpaid internships and why such changes are desirable. 
I.  THE HISTORY OF INTERNSHIP REGULATION 
Modern internship regulation began in 1938, when Congress enacted 
FLSA.37 Congress tasked WHD to protect workers and to ensure 
employer compliance with FLSA’s minimum wage standard.38 Even 
though the minimum wage standard is perhaps the most important 
aspect of internship regulation, it was not until 1947 that the Supreme 
Court heard a case that involved unpaid workers and their potential 
entitlement to minimum wage.39 The case, Walling v. Portland 
Terminal, Co., motivated WHD’s later attempts to regulate unpaid 
internships and sparked the confusion that surrounds unpaid internships 
today. 
A.  Walling v. Portland Terminal, Co.: Where the Internship 
Train First Derailed 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s 1947 decision in Walling v. Portland 
Terminal, Co. forms the basis for WHD’s Fact Sheet #71.40 In Portland 
Terminal, the Supreme Court contemplated whether a railroad company 
violated FLSA when it refused to compensate prospective yard 
brakemen with a minimum wage.41 As part of its employment process, 
the railroad company required prospective yard brakemen to attend an 
unpaid practical-training program.42 The railroad company never hired 
workers who failed to complete the program—program completion was 
                                                                                                                     
 37. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–19 (1940). 
 38. Id.; Compliance Assistance, supra note 30. 
 39. Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148 (1947). 
 40. Compare id. at 149–50, 152–53, with FACT SHEET #71, supra note 31. 
 41. Portland Terminal, 330 U.S. at 150. 
 42. Id. at 149, 150. 
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essential to earn the railroad company’s trust.43  
Upon completion of the training program, the railroad company 
offered some of the prospective yard brakemen jobs.44 The railroad 
company placed some of the others into a pool of available qualified 
yard brakemen who could work on an as-needed basis.45 Only the 
brakemen whom the railroad company hired would receive a retroactive 
allowance of $4 per day of training.46  
The main issues in Portland Terminal were whether all of the 
prospective yard brakemen “trainees” qualified as “employees” under 
FLSA and whether all of the prospective yard brakemen deserved 
minimum wage compensation for their participation in the training 
program.47 To resolve the question, the Court examined several factors 
that are now collectively known as the Portland Terminal test.48 
First, the Supreme Court found that the prospective brakemen did 
not displace regular workers.49 Instead, they required constant 
supervision by regular employees who “d[id] most of the work 
themselves.”50 Second, FLSA did not govern the relationship because 
the railroad company did not promise the brakemen a job or 
remuneration for their participation in the program.51 Third, the railroad 
company provided the brakemen with practical training that was similar 
to the instruction the workers would receive from a vocational school.52 
The Supreme Court decided not to penalize the railroad company when 
it provided the same education free of charge.53 Fourth, the training 
primarily benefited the brakemen.54 Similar to students who attend 
school to receive an education, the brakemen learned the skills of a new 
trade in the training program.55 And fifth, the brakemen’s presence 
afforded the railroad company no immediate advantage.56 Instead, the 
brakemen’s presence impeded the railroad company’s operation.57  
                                                                                                                     
 43. Id. at 149. 
 44. Id. at 150. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 149–50. 
 49. Id.  
 50. Id. at 150. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 149. 
 53. Id. at 153. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Justice Black wrote for the Court and argued that FLSA permitted persons to “work 
for their own advantage on the premises of another.” Id. at 152. “Otherwise,” he argued, “all 
students would be employees of the school or college they attended, and as such entitled to 
receive minimum wages.” Id. 
 56. Id. at 153. 
 57. Id. at 150. 
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After the Supreme Court considered each of the factors, it concluded 
that the prospective yard brakemen were trainees and not employees 
entitled to receive a minimum wage.58 With these factors, the Supreme 
Court christened the law’s first voyage into internship regulation. 
B.  Precedent Meets the Modern Internship 
Portland Terminal prompted decades of disparate applications of the 
test. Shortly after the Supreme Court decided Portland Terminal, WHD 
developed six factors to determine whether FLSA requires an employer 
to pay a minimum wage.59 It was not until 2010, however, that WHD 
developed Fact Sheet #71 and applied these factors to unpaid internship 
scenarios.60 Now, according to WHD’s test, for-profit companies may 
use intern labor without paying a minimum wage if the internship meets 
six criteria: 
1. The internship, even though it includes actual operation 
of the facilities of the employer, is similar to training 
which would be given in an educational environment; 
2. The internship experience is for the benefit of the intern; 
3. The intern does not displace regular employees, but 
works under close supervision of existing staff; 
4. The employer that provides the training derives no 
immediate advantage from the activities of the intern; 
and on occasion its operations may actually be impeded; 
5. The intern is not necessarily entitled to a job at the 
conclusion of the internship; and  
6. The employer and the intern understand that the intern is 
not entitled to wages for the time spent in the 
internship.61 
Even with the help of this iteration of the test, courts do not 
uniformly apply FLSA to unpaid internship cases. For example, a 
district court in the Second Circuit, and the Fourth, Fifth, and Tenth 
Circuit Courts of Appeal each apply a different test, not all of which 
incorporate WHD’s six factors.62 Thus, employer “compliance with the 
law is [still] nearly impossible.”63  
                                                                                                                     
 58. Id. at 153. 
 59. See 1 SCHNEIDER & STINE, supra note 33, § 3:13 & n.6. 
 60. FACT SHEET #71, supra note 31. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Archie v. Grand Cent. P’ship, Inc., 997 F. Supp. 504, 531–35 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); 
McLaughlin v. Ensley, 877 F.2d 1207, 1209 n.2 (4th Cir. 1989); Hopkins v. Cornerstone Am., 
545 F.3d 338, 343 (5th Cir. 2008); Reich v. Parker Fire Prot. Dist., 992 F.2d 1023, 1027 (10th 
Cir. 1993). 
 63. Jessica L. Curiale, Note, America’s New Glass Ceiling: Unpaid Internships, the Fair 
Labor Standards Act, and the Urgent Need for Change, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 1531, 1546 (2010). 
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A district court from the Second Circuit adopts the most inclusive 
approach to unpaid internship cases. It considers the individual elements 
of WHD’s six-factor test as part of a more in-depth analysis.64 In Archie 
v. Grand Central Partnership, Inc., for example, the court held that a 
company violated FLSA’s minimum wage requirements when it “failed 
to [first] show that under the six-factor test, the [homeless participants 
in its PTE Training Program] were trainees rather than employees.”65 
The court recognized that though WHD’s test is “not determinative of 
whether a person is an employee under the FLSA, it is a factor to be 
weighed in the analysis.”66  
The Fourth Circuit, on the other hand, rejects the six-prong test and 
applies its own “principal benefit” test.67 Although the Fourth Circuit 
and the Second Circuit make many of the same factual inquiries to 
determine whether a worker deserves a minimum wage, the circuits 
ultimately split over their interpretation of Portland Terminal. In 
Isaacson v. Penn Community Services, the Fourth Circuit interpreted 
Portland Terminal to hold that when the employer “received no 
‘immediate advantage’ from the trainees’ services,”—essentially, when 
“the principal purpose of the seemingly employment relationship was to 
benefit the person in the employee status”—FLSA does not protect the 
worker.68  
The Fifth Circuit uses a less popular “economic realities” test to 
focus on workers’ economic dependence on their employers.69 Though 
the economic realities test involves a few of the same inquiries—such as 
the degree of supervision a worker receives—the economic realities test 
is otherwise distinct.70 It encompasses five factors that range from “the 
extent of the relative investments of the worker and the alleged 
employer” to “the skill and initiative required in performing the job.”71 
Courts infrequently apply the economic realities test to unpaid 
internship cases, however, and more commonly apply it to cases that 
distinguish between employees and volunteers.72 As such, this test 
exerts limited influence over unpaid academic internship cases. 
And finally, the Tenth Circuit uses WHD’s six-prong test as part of a 
totality of the circumstances analysis.73 It rejects an “all or nothing” 
approach to WHD’s test, and instead applies the test as a “relevant but 
                                                                                                                     
 64. Archie, 997 F. Supp. at 531–35. 
 65. Id. at 533, 535. 
 66. Id. at 533. 
 67. McLaughlin, 877 F.2d at 1209 & n.2, 1210. 
 68. Isaacson v. Penn Cmty. Servs., Inc., 450 F.2d 1306, 1309 (4th Cir. 1971). 
 69. See Hopkins v. Cornerstone Am., 545 F.3d 338, 343 (5th Cir. 2008).  
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. E.g., Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 293 (1985). 
 73. Reich v. Parker Fire Prot. Dist., 992 F.2d 1023, 1026–27 (10th Cir. 1993). 
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not conclusive . . . determination of whether . . . trainees [are] 
employees under the FLSA.”74 As such, even when a defendant fails to 
satisfy one prong of WHD’s test, like in Reich v. Parker Fire Prot. 
Dist., the Tenth Circuit can still find that prospective workers or interns 
are trainees and not employees.75 In the Tenth Circuit, a “single factor 
cannot carry the entire weight of an inquiry into the totality of the 
circumstances.”76  
Not all circuits readily adopt aspects of Fact Sheet #71’s six-prong 
test, however. In Solis v. Laurelbrook Sanitarium & School Inc., the 
Sixth Circuit described WHD’s test as a “poor method for determining 
employee status in a training or educational setting” and ultimately 
rejected the six-prong analysis for three reasons.77 First, the Solis court 
found the test “overly rigid and inconsistent with a totality-of-the-
circumstances approach, where no one factor (or the absence of one 
factor) controls.”78 Second, the Solis court identified precedent that 
“found the test’s all-or-nothing approach inconsistent with prior WHD 
interpretations and opinions endorsing a flexible approach, thereby 
diminishing any persuasive force the test might be entitled to.”79 And 
third, the Solis court found WHD’s test to conflict with Portland 
Terminal.80  
Though it noted that the Supreme Court considered “various other 
facets of the relationship” between the trainees and the railroad 
company, the Sixth Circuit believed the Portland Terminal decision 
rested more upon “whether the trainees received the primary benefit of 
the work they performed.”81 Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit developed 
the primary benefit test as a substitute for WHD’s six-prong test.82 
Because Solis found that the high school students received the primary 
benefit from their work in the school’s sanitarium, the students were not 
entitled to receive a minimum wage.83  
Although Solis involves high school students,84 the Sixth Circuit’s 
                                                                                                                     
 74. Id. at 1026–27. 
 75. Id. at 1029. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Solis v. Laurelbrook Sanitarium & Sch. Inc., 642 F.3d 518, 525 (6th Cir. 2011). 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 526. 
 82. Id. at 521, 526–29. 
 83. Id. at 519, 532. The Sixth Circuit did not reach this conclusion by adopting the 
defendant high school’s argument that Portland Terminal stood for the proposition that 
vocational students are automatically classified as non-employees. Instead, the Sixth Circuit 
squarely rejected this argument because its basis was in the dicta of Portland Terminal, not the 
holding. Id. at 523–24. 
 84. Id. at 520. 
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reasoning would likely yield the same result in an unpaid academic 
internship case that involves undergraduate students. In both scenarios, 
the courts would consider the same factors, which would include: the 
amount of on-site supervision the student receives, whether competition 
for labor exists, whether the student’s academic credits transfer to other 
institutions, and whether the employer promises a future job.85 Given 
the similarities between the facts in Solis and the facts many unpaid 
academic internships present, Solis is poised to become a persuasive 
case in the consolidation and reinvention of unpaid academic internship 
regulation.  
C.  The Advent of Unpaid Internship Litigation 
While Solis may persuade courts to adopt the primary benefit test in 
future unpaid academic internship cases, recent litigation could prove 
equally influential. Though these cases do not directly concern unpaid 
academic internships, if courts strictly adhere to Fact Sheet #71, then 
they could inadvertently extinguish unpaid academic internships: to 
eliminate the risk of adverse litigation, employers who cannot afford to 
pay minimum wage will likely discontinue their internship programs, 
even if their internships are academically beneficial.86 
The menace of minimum wage litigation frightens potential 
employers—the money they save by not paying interns does not seem 
worth the legal risk.87 As a result, some interns will realize the benefits 
of current class action litigation if courts strictly adhere to Fact Sheet 
#71. Because some employers, like Fox Searchlight Productions, 
already converted previously unpaid internships into paid positions, 
students can learn new skills and receive a paycheck, too.88  
                                                                                                                     
 85. Id. at 530–31; see also id. at 521 (noting that the majority of practical training courses 
were approved by the state for transfer credit). 
 86. In October 2013, in the midst of unpaid internship litigation, Condé Nast announced 
that it intended to end its internship program. Blair Hickman & Casey McDermott, 2013: The 
Year of the Intern?, NEW PITTSBURGH COURIER (Jan. 12, 2014), http://newpittsburghcourieronline. 
com/2014/01/12/2013-the-year-of-the-intern. Internship outsourcing is another potential consequence 
of unpaid internship litigation. If courts declare unpaid internships illegal, some companies vow to 
respond by “hir[ing] more interns overseas” because their “interns can work remotely from 
anywhere.” Melissa Schorr, The Revolt of the Unpaid Intern, BOS. GLOBE (Jan. 12, 2014), 
http://www.bostonglobe.com/magazine/2014/01/12/unpaid-internships-are-they-doomed/vi8 
MVMlqfeJQHlMY3vlBpJ/story.html.  
 87. Davidson, supra note 9. 
 88. In 2010, Fox Searchlight Productions announced plans to amend its internship 
program to pay all interns $10 per hour. Joe Satran, ‘Black Swan’ Intern Lawsuit Proceeds, 
Striking Blow Against Unpaid Labor in Film, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 24, 2012, 4:39 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/24/black-swan-intern-lawsuit_n_1828206.html (last 
updated Aug. 30, 2012, 9:02 PM). The move was undoubtedly intended to stave off future 
litigation, such as the minimum wage litigation brought by unpaid interns who worked on the 
Black Swan set. Id. Trial in that case was originally set for spring 2013, id., though by June 
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Oftentimes, corporations settle lawsuits outside of court to avoid the 
specter of unlimited liability.89 The Public Broadcasting Service (PBS), 
for example, recently agreed to settle a minimum wage violation class 
action lawsuit.90 A former unpaid intern initiated the lawsuit when she 
claimed that her internship with the Charlie Rose Show violated New 
York labor laws.91 In order to avoid litigation (and potentially 
unfavorable precedent), PBS agreed to pay the lead plaintiff and 189 
similarly situated former interns up to $250,000 in back wages and 
$50,000 in legal fees.92 To the lead plaintiff and to many others who 
watched the case unfold, the settlement marked “a really important 
moment for this movement against unpaid internships.”93  
Not every company, though, is as swift to shift its employment 
policies or settle class action lawsuits. Other companies prefer to defend 
against lawsuits and hope for favorable outcomes. Hearst Corporation, 
the owner of the magazine Harper’s Bazaar, is one such company. 
Despite the onslaught of a recent unpaid intern class action, Hearst 
Corporation set out to “vigorously defend this matter.”94 Throughout the 
litigation, the corporation steadfastly attested to the quality of its unpaid 
internship program: “The internship programs at each of our magazines 
are designed to enhance the educational experience of students who are 
                                                                                                                     
2013, the judge ruled that the interns were entitled to minimum wage. Steven Greenhouse, 
Judge Rules that Movie Studio Should Have Been Paying Interns, N.Y. TIMES (June 11, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/12/business/judge-rules-for-interns-who-sued-fox-searchlig 
ht.html. Perhaps what motivates such policy changes is the fact that “[m]inimum wage isn’t big 
dollars compared to the cost of a lawsuit.” Schorr, supra note 86 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 89. Steven Greenhouse, ‘Charlie Rose’ Show Agrees to Pay Up to $250,000 to Settle Interns’ 
Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2012, 12:34 PM), http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/12/20/ 
charlie-rose-show-agrees-to-pay-up-to-250000-to-settle-interns-lawsuit. In the largest unpaid 
internship class action settlement to date, Elite Model Management agreed to pay $450,000 to 
approximately 150 of the company’s former unpaid interns. In light of the $50 million that the lead 
plaintiff, Daija Davenport, originally sought in unpaid wages, overtime pay, and attorneys’ fees under 
FLSA, however, $450,000 is a small price for the corporation to pay. Ashley Mosley, Why Unpaid 
Internships Are No Catwalk for the Fashion Industry, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 28, 2014, 11:02 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ashley-mosley/why-unpaid-internships-ar_b_4675855.html; Dhani 
Mau, Elite Models to Fork Over $450,000 to Unpaid Interns in Class Action Settlement, 
FASHIONISTA (Jan. 13, 2014, 6:15 PM), http://fashionista.com/2014/01/elite-models-to-fork-over-450000-to-
unpaid-interns-in-class-action-settlement; Jenna Zhang, Elite Model Management Settles with Former 
Unpaid Interns, CHRONICLE (Durham, NC) (Jan. 22, 2014), http://www.dukechronicle.com/articles/ 
2014/01/22/elite-model-management-settles-former-unpaid-interns. 
 90. Greenhouse, supra note 89. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Christopher Zara, Hearst Corp. Seeks Allies in Lawsuit Against Unpaid Interns: 
Report, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2012, 6:00 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/hearst-corp-seeks-
allies-lawsuit-against-unpaid-interns-report-922413. 
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receiving academic credit for their participation, and are otherwise fully 
in compliance with applicable laws.”95 Hearst Corporation’s bold move 
paid off. The corporation escaped a debilitating settlement and steep 
attorney’s fees96 when the judge refused to grant class action status to 
Wang and the other interns.97 Now, a few summers worth of wages is 
the most Hearst Corporation stands to lose when it faces Wang and six 
other interns alone.98 
Other corporations’ litigation prospects are more expensive. When a 
federal district court judge applied Fact Sheet #71’s test to the Black 
Swan unpaid intern class action lawsuit,99 he determined that Fox 
Searchlight Production’s interns were employees.100 Accordingly, the 
production company violated minimum wage laws when it refused to 
pay the plaintiff interns.101 
The judge’s rejection of the primary benefit test in favor of Fact 
Sheet #71’s six prongs darkened the prospects of corporations 
embroiled in unpaid intern litigation.102 Though the Black Swan case 
presents but one of many conflicting court opinions, it suggests that 
courts no longer tolerate unpaid internships and instead require strict 
compliance with Fact Sheet #71’s six prongs.  
Given the existent discrepancies amongst the circuits, even when 
courts resolve pending unpaid internship class actions, it is unlikely that 
a clear answer will emerge as to which internships require a minimum 
wage. Because the pending and recently decided cases do not involve 
unpaid academic internships, a ruling in favor of the plaintiff interns 
would not automatically ban all unpaid academic internships. 
Nevertheless, such a ruling would serve as persuasive fodder for future 
arguments and, in the meantime, would convince many employers to 
                                                                                                                     
 95. Id. While Hearst Corporation’s justification seems convincing, the facts that lead 
plaintiff Xeudan “Diana” Wang was twenty-seven years old and was not pursuing academic 
credit for her fifty-five hour workweeks suggest that even if this policy existed, Hearst 
Corporation did not follow it. See id. But see infra notes 123–24 and accompanying text 
(offering reasons why, contrary to Hearst Corporation’s argument, an intern’s receipt of 
academic credit does not exempt an employer from FLSA’s minimum wage requirements). 
 96. See Rebecca Greenfield, Class Action or Not, the Unpaid Intern Lawsuit at Hearst 
Will Go On, WIRE (May 9, 2013, 2:15 PM), http://www.thewire.com/national/2013/05/class-
action-or-not-unpaid-intern-lawsuit-will-go/65059. 
 97. Wang v. Hearst Corp., 293 F.R.D. 489, 498 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 98. Greenfield, supra note 96. 
 99. Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., 293 F.R.D. 516, 531 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 100. Id. at 534. 
 101. Id. 
 102. See id. at 532 (noting that under the test “the very same internship position might be 
compensable as to one intern . . . and not compensable as to another”). Corporations’ prospects 
darken because, arguably under Fact Sheet #71’s six prongs, “[t]he more useless the intern, the 
better (legally speaking),” and most corporations cannot demonstrate a sufficient degree of 
uselessness. Schorr, supra note 86. 
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cancel their internship programs. If the plaintiff interns lose their class 
action lawsuits or if they continue to settle, then the uncertain legal 
status of unpaid academic internships will likely persist. 
II.  THE MODERN UNPAID INTERNSHIP: IS IT LEGAL? 
Despite major shifts in the economic and employment landscapes 
after 1947, several outdated aspects of Portland Terminal persist in 
current unpaid internship regulation.103 Fact Sheet #71’s effort to apply 
a modernized version of the Portland Terminal test is little more than 
superficial—while the original factors remain almost wholly intact, the 
most significant update is the substitution of “intern” and “internship” 
for the Portland Terminal terms “trainee” and “training.”104  
Yesterday’s stagnant standard is not an effective solution to 
internship regulation today. The Supreme Court decided Portland 
Terminal in a different era. Nearly a decade past the worst of the Great 
Depression, in 1947, the year Portland Terminal was decided, the 
unemployment rate rested at a healthy 3.9%.105 Students of this era 
received less formal education than their modern counterparts. In the 
years that immediately preceded Portland Terminal, only 6% of men 
and 4% of women completed four years of college.106 Moreover, among 
adults twenty-five years of age and older, the median number of years 
of education hovered around 8.6.107 
Americans today face a markedly different employment 
environment. The unemployment rate is at 6.7% as of March 2014108 
after having been above 8% for forty-three months,109 a period that 
economists likened to a Great Recession.110  Education attainment rates 
                                                                                                                     
 103. See supra Section I.B for the Sixth Circuit’s criticism of WHD’s outdated six-prong 
test. 
 104. Compare FACT SHEET #71, supra note 31, with Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 
U.S. 148, 149–50 (1947). 
 105. Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey, BUREAU OF LABOR STATS. 
[hereinafter Labor Force Statistics], http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat01.htm. 
 106. NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, 120 YEARS OF AMERICAN EDUCATION: A 
STATISTICAL PORTRAIT 7 (Thomas D. Snyder ed., 1993). 
 107. Id. 
 108. News Release, Bureau of Labor Stats., U.S. Dep’t of Labor, The Employment 
Situation—March 2014 (Apr. 4, 2014, 8:30 AM), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/
empsit_04042014.pdf. 
 109. Table of Monthly Unemployment Statistics from the Current Population Survey, 
BUREAU OF LABOR STATS., http://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LNS14000000 (last visited June 17, 
2014). 
 110. See, e.g., Robert J. Samuelson, Rethinking the Great Recession, WILSON Q., Winter 
2011, at 16, 17. While the recession, as economists define it, ended in June 2009, US Business 
Cycle Expansions and Contractions, NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, http://www.nber.org/
cycles/cyclesmain.html (last visited June 17, 2014), popular sentiment is that the recession 
continued much longer (or is still continuing), John W. Schoen, Many Feel Like Recession Still 
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are also high. In 2010, 89% of 25- to 29-year-olds received at least a 
high school diploma or equivalent certificate,111 and 32% of 25- to 29-
year-olds held at least a bachelor’s degree.112  
Thus, WHD governs a different employment market than existed in 
the years after Portland Terminal—the current market features a 
fundamentally different type of worker with an overall higher level of 
formal education. And although legislators should not abandon Portland 
Terminal in its entirety, if they are to accommodate the current labor 
landscape, then legislators must adapt the test beyond the substitution of 
“intern” for “trainee.”113 Rather than focus solely on the protection of 
blue-collar workers, labor regulations must strike a balance between 
protection and opportunity for modern, educated workers.  
Scholarly solutions to strike this balance abound. Some of the most 
recent proposed reforms include eliminating unpaid internships in 
certain industries,114 exempting certain industries from minimum wage 
requirements,115 and creating a new “intern-learner” exemption that 
permits interns to work for subminimum wages.116 And although some 
of these solutions do not contemplate unpaid academic internships, their 
theoretical bases can nevertheless guide legislators tasked with unpaid 
academic internship regulation reform.  
A.  An Endangered Species of Internship 
Professors Kristi L. Schoepfer and Mark Dodds suggest perhaps the 
most drastic form of regulation: the elimination of unpaid academic 
internships.117 While their symposium article limits its scope to unpaid 
internships in the sport management industry, the authors’ main concern 
applies to employers in all fields: does an unpaid intern’s value 
outweigh associated legal risks?118 Schoepfer and Dodds do not believe 
so.119 
                                                                                                                     
Hasn’t Ended, USA TODAY (Jan. 1, 2014, 8:05 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/
money/personalfinance/2014/01/01/cnbc-recovery-slowed-economy/4222929. 
 111. NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATS., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., NCES 2011-033, THE CONDITION 
OF EDUCATION 2011, at 74 (2011). 
 112. Id. 
 113. See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
 114. Kristi L. Schoepfer & Mark Dodds, Internships in Sport Management Curriculum: 
Should Legal Implications of Experiential Learning Result in the Elimination of the Sport 
Management Internship?, 21 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 183, 196–97 (2010). 
 115. Jennifer J. Kalyuzhny, Comment, Cultivating the Next Generation: Why Farming 
Internships Should Be Legal, 21 SAN JOAQUIN AGRIC. L. REV. 131, 132–33 (2012). 
 116. Curiale, supra note 63, at 1531.  
 117. Schoepfer & Dodds, supra note 114, at 184.  
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 197. 
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Because sport organizations often solicit interns and benefit from 
their presence, unpaid academic internships expose sport organizations 
to labor law liability.120 Unpaid sport management internships are risky 
because little legal precedent addresses the specific subgenre of unpaid 
academic internships.  
WHD warns employers that despite the lack of harmonious legal 
precedent, “internships in the for-profit private sector will most often be 
viewed as employment, unless the [six-part] test . . . is met.”121 Stated 
more bluntly, Nancy J. Leppink, then-acting director of WHD, said, 
“[i]f you’re a for-profit employer or you want to pursue an internship 
with a for-profit employer, there aren’t going to be many circumstances 
where you can have an internship and not be paid and still be in 
compliance with the law.”122  
Leppink’s cautionary advice shatters an assumption many sport 
organizations make—if an unpaid intern receives academic credit for 
the internship, then the intern will qualify as the primary beneficiary of 
the internship, and the employer is not obligated to pay the intern 
minimum wage.123 Nor does the receipt of academic credit legitimize 
menial tasks like paper-pushing or coffee brewing. DOL’s statement 
deconstructs this misguided notion: “the only acceptable activities for 
unpaid interns are those that are purely for teaching purposes and do not 
help with [a host organization’s] day-to-day tasks.”124  
For this reason, with the advent of less risky alternatives, Schoepfer 
and Dodds advise sport management programs to eliminate their unpaid 
academic internship opportunities.125 Academic accreditation boards 
previously required universities to provide internship opportunities for 
sport management students.126 Recently revised standards, however, 
demonstrate a trend more in line with Schoepfer and Dodds’s advice. In 
lieu of the prior internship requirement, accreditation boards now permit 
schools to substitute a capstone experience or a comprehensive exam.127  
Although Schoepfer and Dodds’s recommendation to evaluate 
unpaid academic internships on an industry-by-industry basis eliminates 
legal risks, it more closely resembles scorched-earth policy than 
compromise. Beneficial unpaid academic internships in the sport 
                                                                                                                     
 120. Id. “Any employer that violates FLSA minimum wage standards may be liable for 
unpaid wages, compensatory damages, and additional liquidated damages.” Id. at 198. 
 121. Id. at 194 (alterations in original) (quoting FACT SHEET #71, supra note 31) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 122. Id. at 198 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 123. Id. at 195–96. 
 124. Id. at 196 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Essentially, “[t]he 
more useless the intern, the better (legally speaking).” Schorr, supra note 86. 
 125. Schoepfer & Dodds, supra note 114, at 184, 201. 
 126. Id. at 189. 
 127. Id. 
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management industry exist, but these opportunities will vanish if 
employers heed Schoepfer and Dodds’s advice.128 Certainly, an 
alternative to complete elimination could balance protection with 
opportunity and could separate educationally beneficial unpaid 
internships from educationally deficient unpaid internships. 
B.  An Advocate for Agricultural Exemption 
Jennifer Kalyuzhny’s Comment presents the foil to Schoepfer and 
Dodds’s argument. Kalyuzhny’s view supports an industry-by-industry 
exemption of unpaid academic internships from the minimum wage 
requirement, rather than an elimination of all unpaid academic 
internships within select industries.129 More specifically, her proposal 
exempts from minimum wage requirements all unpaid agricultural 
internships.130  
The premise behind Kalyuzhny’s proposal is that the main problems 
FLSA regulates do not plague unpaid internships in industries such as 
agriculture. For example, Kalyuzhny asserts that unpaid agricultural 
interns lack the skills and qualifications necessary to replace paid 
workers, whereas unpaid interns in other industries displace paid 
workers and drive wages down.131 Because of this difference, unpaid 
agricultural interns are less of a threat to paid workers than the typical 
unpaid intern.  
Kalyuzhny also argues that agricultural internships do not typically 
lead to a permanent job with the same employer.132 Most often, 
agricultural internships are short-term opportunities to learn valuable 
skills that interns can later apply to their own farms.133 Unpaid 
agricultural interns are thus less likely than the typical unpaid intern to 
overly depend on their employer.134 Given these distinctions, 
Kalyuzhny reasons that unpaid agricultural internships are distinctive 
enough to warrant their exemption from minimum wage laws.135 
                                                                                                                     
 128. See sources cited supra note 86 (noting that one firm terminated its internship 
program and other firms considered outsourcing their internships due to the litigious 
environment). 
 129. See Kalyuzhny, supra note 115, at 133, 147–49. 
 130. Id. at 151. 
 131. Id. at 152. 
 132. Id. at 152–53 (noting that these interns usually go on to run their own farms). 
 133. Id. at 152. 
 134. Id. at 153. 
 135. Id. at 152–53. Kalyuzhny’s proposed industry-wide exemption surpasses all previous 
state-level initiatives to soften regulation of the agricultural industry. California, for example, 
developed a program that incorporates 1800 hours of fieldwork and 11 academic courses in 
order to introduce students interested in agricultural careers to classroom and on-site learning. 
Washington developed a program that allows farms with annual sales of less than $250,000 to 
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Despite the validity of many aspects of her theory, Kalyuzhny’s 
industry-by-industry exemption falls prey to many of the same 
weaknesses that plague Schoepfer and Dodds’s proposal. These 
common weaknesses stem from the authors’ compartmentalized 
approaches. An industry-by-industry analysis assumes that all unpaid 
internships within the same industry are similar enough that WHD can 
make a single determination as to whether a given industry’s academic 
internships are legal. WHD can make such a determination only when it 
categorizes industries in accordance with a much narrower scope than 
“sport management” or “agriculture.” For example, even though WHD 
could classify both an internship on a farm and an internship in the John 
Deere corporate office as “agricultural” internships, the two internships 
present a very different set of educational and legal concerns.  
Only narrow classifications can account for the meaningful 
differences between various sub-industries.136 But as the scope narrows, 
other problems arise. One of the largest problems is that members of 
nearly every industry can make the same type of arguments Kalyuzhny 
makes for the agriculture industry.137 As each sub-industry lobbies for a 
minimum wage exemption, the increasing number of exemptions 
reduces the effectiveness of any WHD rule. 
A better approach focuses not on distinctions between industries but 
on characteristics within every industry that distinguish educationally 
beneficial unpaid internships from educationally deficient unpaid 
internships. Every industry offers both types of internships, but 
Schoepfer’s, Dodds’s, and Kalyuzhny’s approaches treat all internships 
within the same industry identically. Because the authors focus on 
differences between industries, their proposed regulations do not focus 
on the core purpose of academic internship regulation: the educational 
benefit that the intern derives. 
C.  The “Intern-Learner” as the New “Learner” Exemption 
Jessica L. Curiale’s Note steers away from the industry-by-industry 
approach her scholarly predecessors adopt, and instead carefully 
considers the mechanics of internship reform.138 Curiale proposes that 
WHD promulgate an “intern-learner” exemption that is similar to the 
current “learner” exemption.139  
                                                                                                                     
retain up to three unpaid interns per year. For a description and Kalyuzhny’s criticism of the 
California and Washington programs, see id. at 147–49. 
 136. Even narrow exceptions, however, cannot account for new, developing industries that 
do not fit neatly within the definition of any current industry. 
 137. At the very least, every industry can argue that it produces enough academically 
beneficial internships to preempt WHD from classifying any of the industry’s unpaid internships 
as illegal. 
 138. See generally Curiale, supra note 63. 
 139. Id. at 1553–54. 
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Under this new exemption, if qualified employers create DOL-
approved “intern-training” programs, then they can pay interns a 
subminimum wage.140 Ideally, Curiale’s exemption and its associated 
program would ensure that interns who deserve compensation receive 
wages for their work and that the number of illegal unpaid internships 
dwindles.141 Nevertheless, Curiale’s proposal is problematic for two 
reasons. 
First, employers must exert significant effort to establish an intern-
training program and, in exchange, gain only the right to pay their 
interns 15% less than the normal minimum wage.142 The employer must 
not only submit a detailed proposal but also stay within strictly defined 
intern-training program parameters.143 For instance, if either an 
employer’s number of interns fluctuates or the length of the intern-
training program varies, then the employer must start over and reapply 
for a new exemption.144 Even if an employer’s intern-training program 
does not change, the employer’s exemption is valid for only two 
years.145  
Potential employers who are already unwilling or unable to pay their 
interns a minimum wage are unlikely to undergo the hassle of the 
intern-training program approval process, especially for a paltry 15% 
minimum wage reduction. Many illegal internships evade DOL 
detection,146 and Curiale’s bureaucracy does little to incentivize 
employer participation in the intern-training program that she proposes. 
Even today, small companies often escape minimum wage scrutiny 
because interns have little incentive to individually litigate a minimum 
wage claim.147 As long as they can evade DOL detection, smaller 
businesses would still have a strong incentive to ignore Curiale’s 
program and thereby avoid the requirement to pay their interns the 
remaining 85% of the minimum wage.  
The second complication with Curiale’s proposed intern-learner 
exemption is that it offers no new mechanism for enforcement. Its 
requirements are easy to evade or falsify, and the WHD Administrator 
depends on the employer to implement the intern-training program that 
                                                                                                                     
 140. Id. at 1554. 
 141. Id. at 1531, 1559–60. 
 142. Id. at 1554. 
 143. Id. at 1554–55. 
 144. Id. at 1554. 
 145. Id. 
 146. See Angie Mohr, The Ethics and Economics of Unpaid Internships, INVESTOPEDIA, 
(May 28, 2012), http://www.investopedia.com/financial-edge/0512/the-ethics-and-economics-
of-unpaid-internships.aspx (“[T]he Labor Department will only investigate based on complaints. 
Interns are unlikely to report their employers’ labor violations for fear of damaging their 
relationship and future opportunities.”). 
 147. See supra Section I.C for a discussion of current unpaid internship litigation. 
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the employer describes in the initial application. WHD may deny an 
application for a certificate,148 but once WHD exempts an employer, 
WHD has little ability to ensure the employer complies with the intern-
training program. 
As interns are already unlikely to report discrepancies,149 it is 
ineffective to rely on interns to report noncompliance. Curiale’s 
proposal fails to give interns new motivation to report abuses. Given 
that educationally deficient internships can easily evade DOL detection, 
and given that Curiale’s highly bureaucratic requirements deter 
educationally beneficial internships, a different regulatory mechanism 
must protect students and ensure employer compliance. 
III.  MODIFY, CODIFY, AND DELEGATE: THREE STEPS TOWARD 
INTERNSHIP REFORM 
Unpaid academic internship regulations are ineffective when they 
operate either through a cumbersome exception or by industry-by-
industry distinction. These approaches make artificial determinations 
that fail to distinguish between educationally beneficial and 
educationally deficient internships. These approaches distinguish unpaid 
internships only in relation to one another—they cannot make the 
necessary individualized determinations of educational value that 
effective regulation requires. 
A.  The Department of Education’s Role in Internship Regulation 
The first step toward effective internship reform is delegation. An 
effective regulatory solution must distinguish educationally beneficial 
internships from educationally deficient internships, and Congress must 
delegate to the proper agency the authority to make these 
determinations.  
DOL, the current regulatory agency, is not the proper agency for the 
job because DOL prioritizes economic considerations above educational 
value. DOL’s mission is to “foster, promote, and develop the welfare of 
the wage earners, job seekers, and retirees of the United States; improve 
working conditions; advance opportunities for profitable employment; 
and assure work-related benefits and rights.”150 Education-related 
concerns are neither specifically mentioned within the mission 
statement nor readily observable in DOL’s current regulatory efforts. 
DOL’s framework demonstrates that the agency is not equipped to 
                                                                                                                     
 148. See Curiale, supra note 63, at 1554. 
 149. See Mohr, supra note 146 (“Interns are unlikely to report their employers’ labor 
violations for fear of damaging their relationship and future opportunities.”). 
 150. Our Mission, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/opa/aboutdol/mission.htm 
(last visited June 17, 2014). 
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maximize educational value and legalize educationally beneficial 
opportunities.  
Instead, the ED is better situated to achieve these fundamental goals. 
Unlike DOL’s mission, ED’s mission aligns with the concerns of unpaid 
academic internships: “to promote student achievement and preparation 
for global competitiveness by fostering educational excellence and 
ensuring equal access.”151 ED is also the appropriate regulatory agency 
because ED is already tasked with “[i]dentify[ing] major issues in 
education and focus[ing] national attention on them.”152 Because ED 
already seeks to maximize educational value and to create meaningful 
learning opportunities, ED can quickly transition into a key internship-
regulating role. Congress’s first step toward internship reform should 
therefore be to enact a law that delegates to ED—not DOL—the power 
to regulate unpaid academic internships. 
B.  Proposed Revisions 
The next steps in Congress’s unpaid academic internship reformation 
should be (1) to modify WHD’s six-prong test and (2) to codify a new 
version of the test, a version that will serve as a starting point for ED’s 
unpaid academic internship regulation. Though WHD would no longer 
play an active regulatory role in unpaid academic internship regulation, 
Congress should not extinguish WHD’s six-prong test. The six prongs 
evolved through decades of case law,153 and it would prove nearly 
impossible to ignore this lengthy, albeit conflicting, pedigree. Yet as 
currently written, Fact Sheet #71 facilitates neither easy understanding 
nor easy application of the precedent to the realities of unpaid academic 
internships.  
Two minor modifications and one major modification will 
incorporate fundamental elements of case law and enable ED to better 
regulate unpaid academic internships. First, ED should lead its list of 
prongs with the standard it intends to apply to unpaid academic 
internships. Second, ED should describe the type of unpaid academic 
internship it intends to regulate. Third, ED should describe prohibitions 
on unpaid academic internships. And fourth, ED should describe the 
mutual understandings employer and intern must share. The following 
table summarizes the proposed revisions: 
                                                                                                                     
 151. What We Do, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., http://www.ed.gov/about/what-we-do.html (last 
modified Feb. 2, 2010). 
 152. Id. 
 153. See supra Section I.B for a discussion of case law analyzing Walling v. Portland 
Terminal Co. and Fact Sheet #71. 
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CURRENT FACT SHEET #71 
PROVISIONS 
PROPOSED REVISIONS 
1. The internship, even though it 
includes actual operation of the 
facilities of the employer, is 
similar to training which would 
be given in an educational 
environment; 
1. The internship experience is for 
the benefit of the intern; as 
long as the internship primarily 
benefits the intern, the 
employer may derive some 
advantage from the intern’s 
activities;
2. The internship experience is for 
the benefit of the intern; 
2. During the internship, the 
intern receives training and 
supervision similar to the 
training and supervision that 
the intern would receive in a 
traditional educational 
environment;
3. The intern does not displace 
regular employees, but works 
under close supervision of 
existing staff; 
3. The intern does not displace 
paid employees; and 
4. The employer that provides the 
training derives no immediate 
advantage from the activities of 
the intern; and on occasion its 
operations may actually be 
impeded;
4. The intern and the employer 
understand that, upon 
completion of the internship, 
the intern is neither entitled to 
wages nor entitled to a job. 
5. The intern is not necessarily 
entitled to a job at the 
conclusion of the internship; 
and 
6. The employer and the intern 
understand that the intern is not 
entitled to wages for the time 
spent in the internship. 
 
1.  Separating Displacement and Supervision 
 
The first minor modification Congress must make is to rearrange the 
content of Fact Sheet #71’s first and third prongs and craft two new 
provisions: 
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CURRENT FACT SHEET #71 
PROVISIONS 
PROPOSED REVISIONS 
1. The internship, even though it 
includes actual operation of the 
facilities of the employer, is 
similar to training which would 
be given in an educational 
environment; 
2. During the internship, the 
intern receives training and 
supervision similar to the 
training and supervision that 
the intern would receive in a 
traditional educational 
environment;
3. The intern does not displace 
regular employees, but works 
under close supervision of 
existing staff; 
3. The intern does not displace 
paid employees;  
 
The above revisions group similar topics, separate dissimilar topics, 
and emphasize the significance of each requirement. Though a link 
exists between displacement and supervision,154 the two provisions are 
not inextricably related. The displacement requirement is primarily 
concerned with labor issues, not educational value, whereas supervision 
has more in common with academic value than labor issues.  
When it stands alone, the displacement requirement emphasizes 
WHD’s no-tolerance policy for unpaid internships that infringe upon 
existent labor interests. Without the modifying clause regarding 
supervision, the third prong can clearly indicate that an internship is 
illegal if an unpaid intern displaces a paid worker. The supervision 
requirement’s new location in the second prong also promotes clarity 
and alleviates employer confusion. Whereas the original six prongs left 
employers to wonder whether their workplace environment modeled a 
traditional educational environment, the incorporation of the 
supervision requirement into the educational environment provision 
demonstrates one way in which employers may satisfy this 
requirement.155  
2.  Consolidating Disclosure 
Second, Congress should combine Fact Sheet #71’s fifth and sixth 
prongs to clarify the test’s disclosure requirements: 
 
                                                                                                                     
 154. See FACT SHEET #71, supra note 31 (using the first criteria to describe supervision and 
the third criteria to describe displacement). 
 155. Id. (“[I]f the employer is providing . . . [internships] under the close and constant 
supervision of regular employees, but the intern performs no or minimal work, the activity is 
more likely to be viewed as a bona fide education experience.”). 
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CURRENT FACT SHEET #71 
PROVISIONS 
PROPOSED REVISIONS 
5. The intern is not necessarily 
entitled to a job at the 
conclusion of the internship; 
and 
4. The intern and the employer 
understand that, upon 
completion of the internship, 
the intern is neither entitled to 
wages nor entitled to a job. 
6. The employer and the intern 
understand that the intern is not 
entitled to wages for the time 
spent in the internship. 
 
Though the fifth and sixth prongs both operate to promote full 
disclosure between interns and their employers, the words of the current 
six-prong test do not accomplish this goal. As currently written, mutual 
understanding and disclosure between an intern and an employer are 
components in only the sixth prong: “The employer and the intern 
understand that the intern is not entitled to wages for the time spent in 
the internship.”156 The fifth prong contains no such disclosure 
component. Instead, the fifth prong simply states that “[t]he intern is not 
necessarily entitled to a job at the conclusion of the internship.”157  
So while the employer and intern must both understand that the 
intern is not entitled to wages, they need not both understand that the 
intern should not expect a job at the conclusion of the internship. This 
interpretation suggests that as long as an employer knows that an intern 
should not expect a job at the internship’s conclusion, a court can find 
that the internship satisfies the fifth prong, even if the intern was 
unaware that she should not expect a job. Under this interpretation, the 
fifth prong does not promote candor and does not adequately protect 
students. Congress can solve these problems if it merges the fifth and 
sixth prongs and requires full disclosure of both wage rules and job 
prospects. With this minor modification, Congress can eliminate both a 
senseless discrepancy and a potential inequity in bargaining power. 
3.  Adopting a Modified Primary Beneficiary Standard 
Most unpaid academic internships are illegal because they do not 
satisfy Fact Sheet #71’s fourth prong: employers cannot derive any 
immediate advantage or benefit from an intern’s “activities.”158 WHD’s 
                                                                                                                     
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. (emphasis added); cf. Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 152 (1947) 
(noting that FLSA allows one to work on the premises of another for her own personal 
advantage); Isaacson v. Penn Cmty. Servs., Inc., 450 F.2d 1306, 1309 (4th Cir. 1971) (noting 
that FLSA does not protect those who work for their own advantage). 
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bright-line standard oversimplifies decades of judicial precedent and 
presents the best area for major modification.  
As evidenced by the disagreement amongst the Second, Fourth, 
Fifth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits,159 there is no widely accepted legal 
standard to determine whether an unpaid internship complies with 
FLSA. Few courts demand strict compliance with the six-prong test.160 
More typically, courts adopt some iteration of the six-prong test as the 
basis for a broader factual inquiry.161 WHD, however, refuses to 
consider the more individualized aspects of internships and instead 
demands strict compliance with the six-prong test in every instance. To 
complicate matters further, WHD’s interpretation of the six-prong test is 
riddled with internal conflicts and inconsistencies.  
WHD’s use of undefined and vague terms, for example, introduces 
interpretive flexibility in the second prong.162 WHD states that “[t]he 
internship experience is for the benefit of the intern,”163 but the test fails 
to define “benefit.” Fact Sheet #71’s first explanatory paragraph 
introduces further ambiguity into the meaning of “benefit.”164 The 
second part of the paragraph’s title, “Primary Beneficiary Of The 
Activity,” evokes the Solis primary benefit approach, not the test’s 
purported bright-line standard.165  
The portion of WHD’s explanatory paragraph that prohibits an intern 
from “perform[ing] . . . routine work . . . on a regular and recurring 
basis” strays even further from the bright-line standard and moves 
toward a primary benefit approach.166 The explanatory language 
suggests that the employer may benefit from an intern’s work as long as 
the employer is not dependent on the intern.167 Yet this suggestion 
directly contradicts the test’s fourth prong that states that an employer 
cannot derive any benefit.168 It is unclear how to resolve these conflicts 
in the current test. 
Rather than attempt to resolve the conflicts of an outdated, stringent 
standard, Congress should codify the primary benefit legal standard to 
incorporate moderation and internal consistency: 
                                                                                                                     
 159. See supra Section I.B for a discussion of the various standards courts apply to 
minimum wage cases. 
 160. See supra Section I.B.  
 161. See supra Section I.B. 
 162. FACT SHEET #71, supra note 31. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id.  
 165. Id. (capitalization in original); Solis v. Laurelbrook, 642 F.3d 518, 525 (6th Cir. 
2011). 
 166. FACT SHEET #71, supra note 31; Solis, 642 F.3d at 525. 
 167. FACT SHEET #71, supra note 31. 
 168. See id. (stating that the employer should “derive[] no immediate advantage” from the 
internship). 
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CURRENT FACT SHEET #71 
PROVISIONS 
PROPOSED REVISIONS 
2. The internship experience is for 
the benefit of the intern; 
1. The internship experience is for 
the benefit of the intern; as 
long as the internship primarily 
benefits the intern, the 
employer may derive some 
advantage from the intern’s 
activities;
4. The employer that provides the 
training derives no immediate 
advantage from the activities of 
the intern; and on occasion its 
operations may actually be 
impeded;
 
The revised standard not only legalizes mutually beneficial unpaid 
academic internships but also affords ED and courts discretion to 
regulate borderline cases. The primary benefit standard addresses the 
realities of unpaid academic internships and maximizes the number of 
educationally beneficial opportunities available to students. 
CONCLUSION 
Academic internships benefit students. They provide opportunities to 
discover new careers, network with professionals, and learn different 
skills. Yet under Fact Sheet #71’s current guidelines, nearly all unpaid 
academic internships fail WHD’s six-prong test.  
Fact Sheet #71 fails to effectively regulate unpaid academic 
internships because it imposes upon students and employers unrealistic 
requirements that undermine opportunities to foster students’ 
professional growth. The failure of the current test to address economic 
and employment realities leads to inconsistent enforcement and 
inconsistent judicial interpretation. 
Though some employers undoubtedly abuse this source of unpaid 
labor, Congress and ED can minimize unfair practices and maximize 
educational value if they regulate unpaid academic internships on a 
more individualized basis and differentiate between educationally 
beneficial unpaid academic internships and educationally deficient 
unpaid academic internships. Modifying WHD’s six-prong test, 
codifying a new test, and delegating regulatory power to ED all promote 
the permanency that students, employers, and courts seek. Unpaid 
academic internships play a vital role in the development of the 
American workforce. Congress cannot permit conflicts in precedent and 
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rigid regulations to shortchange students, employers, and the American 
economy of a strong, qualified, and competitive workforce. 
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